To Hate Sheperds. Letter to an American Friend about a Jules Verne Story (Or Why technological objects sometimes complicates our lives) by Schuerewegen, F.M.J.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
To Hate Shepherds: Letter to an American Friend about a Jules




SubStance, Issue 105 (Volume 33, Number 3), 2004, pp. 23-33 (Article)
Published by University of Wisconsin Press
DOI: 10.1353/sub.2004.0046
For additional information about this article
                                             Access Provided by Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen at 11/26/12  9:25AM GMT
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sub/summary/v033/33.3schuerewegen.html
SubStance #105, Vol 33, no.3, 2004
23To Hate Shepherds
To Hate Shepherds:
Letter to an American Friend about a Jules Verne
Story (or Why Technological Objects Sometimes
Complicate Our Lives)
Franc Schuerewegen
Are there any shepherds left in America?  I suppose you have
replaced them with computers or robots.  Its less expensive and cleaner.
Jules Verne would have liked to live in your countryhe was generous
with his invectives against the race of sheepherders in his novel Le Château
des Carpathes (1892).  You know the book, and Im sure you recall a passage
that I personally find very striking.  At first, the tone is rather flattering:
If we approach a shepherd on his idealistic side, he might easily be
imagined a dreamy, contemplative being:  he converses with the planets,
he consults the stars, he reads the skies (9).  The next sentence undoes
this portrait.  The shepherd is not like that, Jules Verne adds, he is less
than that, and one must set the record straight:  In reality he is generally
a stupid ignorant brute (9).  In the style of hitting the enemy where it
hurts, it would be hard to do better.  Jules Verne does not like shepherds,
a group that clearly annoys him and gets under his skin.  He immediately
proceeds to criticize the leading names in the bucolic genre, accusing
them of idealism and of a lack of realism, something George Sand had
done before him in her preface to François le Champi (1864).1  But this makes
his remarks no less violent.  One must add, of course, that the majority of
shepherds were illiterate at the end of the nineteenth century.  They did
not therefore constitute for the author of the Voyages extraordinaires what
we would call today a reading public  But lets not linger on this point.
Things hardly get better when we meet the shepherd Frik on the
same page.  He is not a particularly pleasant individualin fact, and I
choose my words carefully, he is nothing short of monstrous.  In
describing this character, Jules Verne repeats Victor Hugos sentence
parodying Virgil in the title of a chapter of Notre-Dame de Paris:  Immanis
pecoris custos immanior ipse, of a monstrous flock a herder even more
monstrous.  This is an allusion to the famous verse of the fifth eclogue:
Formosi pectoris custos formosior ipse, of a handsome flock a shepherd
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even more handsome.2  Frik, then, is the Quasimodo of shepherds, the
Frankenstein of this bucolic region.  As Verne puts it:  The immanum pecus
were browsing, then, under the care of the said Frik, immanior ipse (7).  We
can paraphrase in less erudite language:  lovers of idyllic and industrious
country scenes, please abstainthis book is not for you.
What is more striking still, given the context, is that the shepherd
Frik, who has never set foot in a school, presented to us by Verne as a sort
of anthropopitheticus dressed as a shepherd, is also a character who is
respectedeven fearedin his village.  Those who know Frik, writes the
author of Le Château des Carpathes, consider him to be a sorcerer, one who
could call up fantastic apparitions (10).  The shepherd, in other words,
is a magician, a shaman.
You could object, of course, that we do not necessarily have to take
seriously what the villagers say and that this could simply be the effect
of rumors.  But the text ultimately demonstrates that the gossipmongers
are right.  And we thus discover that Frik is a surprisingly and profoundly
contradictory character, who succeeds in being both a perfect imbecile
and an ancestor of Harry Potter...  This contradiction interests me, and I
want to pursue it.
The shepherds task is to watch over his flock.  He thus needs, among
other things, a good pair of eyes.  The shepherd Frik might well not
correspond to the Virgilian idyllic image of the custos formosus, but from
the point of view of vision, he is perfectly within the norm.  Frik, writes
Jules Verne, is doué dune grande puissance de vision, endowed with
great power of vision (9).  Curiously, while his vision might be excellent,
it is not sufficient for him to be able to do without what I am forced to call
a form of mechanical assistance.  When he needs to observe a distant
object, Frik raises his hand to his face, forming what the text calls a
telescope (porte-vue) (8).  The shepherd also possesses another gesture
belonging to the same family, although it is not for the same purpose:  to
be heard at a distance, he has learned to turn his hand into a cone; this is
the technique of the speaking-trumpet (porte-voix) (9).3  I would also
point out in the same vein that Frik has a true instrument, that is, a tool, an
artifact:  a long a long white-wood trumpet, a sort of primitive bugle,
which he uses to call his flock together (10).  In short, Master Frik is
particularly well equipped for what he does and this is certainly
noteworthy.
The gestures that Jules Verne mentions and the tool he describes are
not a priori particularly remarkable, I agree.  At this historical moment,
in this country, all shepherds blow on a horn.  As far as the gesture of
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forming a porte-vue or a porte-voix is concerned, who has not done
this at least once in his life?  Nonetheless, if one has read what comes
afterwards in the story, one knows that it is best to be attentive and that
Jules Verne has a reason for inserting these elements.  On the other side of
the valley, opposite the place where the shepherd works, in the Château
des Carpathes, precisely, lives the Count de Gortz.  He is a crazed music
lover who, using a series of machines that he has constructed, attempts
to conserve living images and the living voice of an opera singer, whom
he cannot seem to forget.  The Beverly Sills at stake here is Stilla, recalling
both E.T.A. Hoffmann and Offenbach.4  Provided we speak several
languages simultaneously, this name summarizes the career of the diva:
star (stella) who was silenced (Die Stille) when death came and took her
from the arms of her lover.  The star who sings no more begins to sing
again with the aid of a certain technology. 5  And if, in principle, the
machines used by the Count de Gortz are unrelated to the rudimentary
technology of the shepherd, one can still see very well what the two have
in common.  The depraved music lover whose story is told in the novel is
a manipulator of sounds and images.  But the supposedly natural shepherd,
in his own modest manner, is also a manipulator of sounds and images.  One
can deduce from all of this that the relations of force initially constructed
in the novel, seemingly based on a conflict between the strong and the
weak, or, in modern parlance, the technology haves and the
technology have-nots, should be approached with some caution.  The
shepherd is a mechanical and technological expert in his own right.  The
primitive man is not so primitive.  With this in mind, I turn to the
episode of the telescope.
Standing before the Château des Carpathes, planted at the end of
one of the castles bastions (9), is a tree, a beech.  The shepherd Frik is
very interested in this beech, because it is linked to a regional legend.
The tree is extremely old and has only three branches.  The villagers say
that when the last branch falls, the Château des Carpathes will collapse.
This is not precisely the case, as those who have read to the end of the
novel know.  The château does not disappear:  on the last page its walls
are still standing (241).  What happened once can happen again, Jules
Verne suggests, in other words, we enter into a vicious circle.  But Im
getting ahead of myself.
On the side of the mountain, while he is looking at the beech tree in
the manner I described, using his hand as a telescope, the shepherd
encounters someone.  A stranger accosts him, a wandering peddler
hawking telescopes, thermometers, barometers, and small clocks (10).
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Once again, the author of Le Château des Carpathes remembers E.T.A.
Hoffmann:  Copelius in The Sandman is also a barometer dealer and a
perverse scholar.6  But this is only a point of departure, and things will
quickly go in another direction.
When the wandering peddler begins his sales banter, he has quite a
job to do.  The shepherd is not interested and indeed expresses himself
quite eloquently.  Buy a clock?  But Ive got one which goes by itself and
hangs over my heard.  Thats the sun up there (14).  The virtues of a
barometer?  Frik does not need a barometer.  Can he not predict the
weather twenty-four hours in advance simply by observing the
movement of the clouds in the sky?  Would he like a thermometer, perhaps?
What a stupid question, the shepherd responds:  when he perspires
beneath his cloak, its hot; when he shivers beneath his greatcoat, its
cold.  What else is there to know?  Do shepherds need to worry about the
whys and wherefores of science?  And so on.
Only when Frik espies a sort of tube hanging from his interlocutors
suspenders does his attitude change.  This object visibly fascinates him,
and he wants to know what it is.  A question is thus formulated:  What
do you do with that tube youve got there?  And the peddler answers,
Its a telescope . . . and a good one, too, . . . one that will make you see a
long way off (15).  Frik has excellent optic nerves, as the preceding
passages in the novel have amply demonstrated.  It is thus only normal
that he chimes in once again with his habitual protests:  Oh!  I have
good eyes, my friend (15).  This time, however, the peddler makes short
work of his objections:  If youve got good eyes, mine are better when I
put them to the end of that telescope (15).  At this point a reversal takes
place; suddenly everything changes.  The peddler proposes that the
shepherd try the telescope, he accepts and is promptly convinced:  Its
true enough.  It does carry farther than my eyes (16).  Here is what
ensues:  through the telescope handed to him by the merchant, Frik begins
to actively survey the countryside that he knows so well, or thought he
knew, but which is suddenly not the same.  Everything is more precise
and present.   But everything has become different as wellunusual,
unheimlich.  Among other things, Frik directs the telescope toward the
beech tree mentioned above.  And we immediately discover that we
have been overly alarmed about it.  True, the fourth branch is down on
the ground (17), and Frik recognizes this with a satisfied air.  True as
well, the legend says that when the beech tree has no more branches, the
château will disappear.  The important thing, however, is not the beech
itself, but what is right next to it.  The important thing that Frik has not
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been able to perceive with his eyes alone is revealed to him only when he uses
the telescope.  Smoke is coming out of the keep of the Château des Carpathes.
It is inhabited, and the novel can thus begin.
I open a short parenthesis here, which will take us away from Jules
Verne for a moment, but rest assured that we shall return to him
momentarily.  I would propose, in fact, to compare Vernes text to a passage
from Marcel Prousts A lombre des jeunes filles en fleurs.  This is a passage in
which Proust describes how his hero, still a child, observes La Berma on
stage with the aid of opera glasses lent to him by his grandmother.  It
would seem that this has nothing to do with Jules Verne, but there is a
relation between the two.  We read the following in Proust:
When one believes in the reality of a thing, making it visible by
artificial means is not quite the same as feeling that it is close at hand.
I thought now that it was no longer Berma at whom I was looking,
but her image in a magnifying glass.  I put the glasses down, but then
possibly the image that my eye received of her, diminished by
distance, was no more exact; which of the two Bermas was real?
(1:345)
There is a resemblance to Vernes text here.  The telescope or the opera
glasses bring a distant object closer.  But when they are used, the object
itself is not perceived, but instead its image, projected on the glass lens.
A difficult choice has to be made, one that Proust finds distressing.
Without the opera glasses, one cannot see anything.   With the opera
glasses, one sees something, but it is not the thing itself, rather, its
simulacrum, something standing in for it.  The user of seeing-aids is like
Buridans ass:  solicited by both sides without knowing how to resolve
the dilemma.
From my perspective, it is clear that in Le Château des Carpathes, the
shepherd Frik is confronted with exactly the same heartrending choice.
This is why he thinks that he is the victim of a mirage when he sees the
smoke.  What he sees is not real, its not possible, he refuses to believe it,
and this is what he says:  No, pedlar, no. . . .  It is the glass of this thing of
yours thats got misty (17).  But even after having wiped the lenses of
the tool with his sleeve, when he brings it back to his eye, the image
reappears, it is indelible, it really exists.  That is, the image really exists.
But can one really make the inference from the image to the existence of
the object?  Prousts question already appears here:  Which one is real?7
The smoke becomes visible only with the aid of the telescope.  But it is
also produced by the use of the telescope.  The effect of the visual prosthesis
is to render our relation to the real uncertain.8
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I would add that the epistemological murkiness into which Jules
Verne plunges his reader has something to do with the fact that smoke is
what the shepherd observes through his telescope.  I recall that in the
typology of signs devised by Charles Sanders Peirce, smoke belongs to
the category of the index, of indices.  The index is a sign . . . in dynamical
(including spatial) connection . . . with the individual object [it
designates] (2:170).  In other words, the index is a motivated or natural
sign.  When one sees the sign, one sees the object as well.  One is observing
the same thing.  The sign is the phenomenon, it is constituted of the same
matter, it is an emanation of that matter.  But the precise problem of the
text we are reading is that the shepherd turns to an artificial instrument
in order to perceive a natural sign and that we thus have a conflict between
two visual registers that are not readily compatible.  The best way to be
sure of the existence of an object is to trust the natural sign.  This elementary
law of perception is, however, what the use of the prosthesis disturbs.
We see the sign, but we cannot conclude from it the existence of the
object.  There is no longer any evidence.  Suddenly we no longer have the
right to say that where there is smoke, there is a fire.
To pursue the episode of the telescope a bit further, following an
onomastic path this time, I must point out as well that among the cast of
characters of Le Château des Carpathes, we find a learned scholar who
answers to the curious name of Orfanik.  In Orfanik, there is an Orpheus.
This right-hand man of the Count de Gortz has the task of resuscitating
a dead person by making her return from the kingdom of shadows.  If we
accept this reasoning, the living dead opera singer, who is at the center of
the novel, is a new Eurydice.9  It is, however, more important for our
argument that Orfanik rimes with Frik, and thus that in the onomastic
system of the novel, something of a relation exists between the learned
scholar and the shepherd.  This confirms what we already know, namely,
that the shepherd, contrary to what one might at first believe, is not the
opposite of the learned scholar.  In reality, Frik prefigures Orfanik, even if
it takes some time to realize this.  The shepherd is the man with the
telescope, curiously unable to be satisfied with observations made by
the naked eye, as we have insisted previously.  But now here is the portrait
of the learned scholar, who himself has the same incapacity.  Lets listen
to Verne:
Orfanik was of middle height, thin, sickly and consumptive, and with
one of those pale faces which are sometimes called death heads.  In
particular he wore a black patch over his right eye, which he had lost
in some physical or chemical experiment; and on his nose was a pair
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of clumsy spectacles, the only lens being that over his left eye,
which had a greenish glow.  (111-12)
Thick glasses, a single lens:  all of this is evident.  Frik and Orfanik are
cousins, or brothers.  They represent a curiously deficient humanity,
obliged to construct objectsremedial tools for what looks very much
like a sort of congenital insufficiency on their part.  But the objects they
build are also, paradoxically, obstacles for them and destabilizing factors.
The thing that helps one see better is also the thing that blinds.  Pursuing
the onomastic route just a bit further, I would add the following:  the
character of the forester in Le Château des Carpathes is a certain Nic Deck.
Nic Deck, as you will recall, is a Fenimore Cooperesque figure.  In fact,
Jules Verne refers explicitly to The Last of the Mohicans in his text.  The
gamekeeper, we read, possesses
that professional instinct, that animal aptitude, so to speak, which is
guided by the slightest indications, projections of the branches in
such and such a direction, irregularities of the ground, colours of the
bark, hues of the mosses where they are exposed to the various
winds.  Nic Deck was too skilled at his trade, and practised it with
too much sagacity to go astray even in localities unknown to him.
He would have been a worthy rival of Leatherstocking or
Chingachgook in the land of Fenimore Cooper.  (56)
There would be much to say about this character, particularly about the
quotation marks Jules Verne puts around the term animal, which must
be understood at a second level.  I will simply point out that the purely
natural being represented by Nic Deck has a very curious name.  Re-
arrange the syllables: Nic Deck.  What does one obtain?  Deck Nic, that is,
technique.  This is another way of indicating that Jules Verne wants nothing
to do with bucolic idylls and country utopias.  For him, nature is
traversed by techniques and the technological, and the author of Le Château
des Carpathes misses no occasion to demonstrate this.
It is time to conclude, that is, to take stock of what we have discovered
and to try to formulate it in a more conceptual and analytical language.
I will do this by recalling a passage from Plato that Bernard Stiegler
points out in his book, La Technique et le temps.  The fragment that interests
me here can be found in the Protagoras (c. 390 B.C.) and concerns what one
might call a narrative of beginnings.  The text is a bit long, but I cannot resist
the pleasure of quoting it in its entirety.  Here is the beginning of the fable:
Once upon a time, there existed gods but no mortal creatures.  When
the appointed time came for these also to be born, the gods formed
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them within the earth out of a mixture of earth and fire and the
substances which are compounded from earth and fire.  And when
they were ready to bring them to the light, they charged Prometheus
and Epimetheus with the task of equipping them and allotting suitable
powers (dunameis) to each kind.  Now Epimetheus begged
Prometheus to allow him to do the distribution himselfand when
I have done it, he said, you can review it.  So he persuaded him
and set to work.
The passage that follows is less humoristic and more tragic.  Epimetheus,
who is not a very skillful god, in fact commits an error:
In his allotment he gave to some creatures strength without speed,
and equipped the weaker kinds with speed.  Some he armed with
weapons, while to the unarmed he gave some other faculty and so
contrived means for their preservation. . . . Thus he made his whole
distribution on a principle of compensation, being careful by these devices
that no species should be destroyed.
Then the error, or the fault as Bernard Stiegler calls it, is occurs:
Now Epithemeus was not a particularly clever person, and before
he realized it he had used up all the available powers on the brute
beasts, and being left with the human race (non-aloga) on his hands
unprovided for, did not know what to do with them.  While he was
puzzling about this, Prometheus came to inspect the work, and found
the other animals well off for everything, but man naked, unshod,
unbedded, and unarmed, and already the appointed day had come,
when man too was to emerge from within the earth into daylight.
Prometheus, therefore, being at a loss to provide any means of
salvation for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena the gift of skill
in the arts (ten enteknen sophian), together with firefor without fire
there was no means (amekhanon) for anyone to possess or use this
skilland bestowed it on man.  In this way man acquired sufficient
resources to keep himself alive.  (Protagoras, 320d-322a, quoted in
Stiegler, 187)
One can thus see that the problem is the same as in Jules Vernes Le Château
des Carpathes:  man is naked, without specialized talents, akosmeton.
He needs technological objects to survive.  To say one needs nothing at
all, as the shepherd affirms,10 is to be a very bad anthropologist:  one
fails to recognize who one is and from whence one comes.  This is indeed
why Prometheus gives humans the gift of fire:  thus homo sapiens can
make himself into homo faber, and ultimately into homo prostheticus.  This
development is logical.  We can say, in other words, that the prosthesis is
necessary for man, even that it constitutes man.
But our analysis does not end there.  What the shepherd also
discovers in Jules Vernes noveland what one must read between the
lines in the Platonic mythis that if man needs objects and if these objects
SubStance #105, Vol 33, no.3, 2004
31To Hate Shepherds
necessarily take on a technological character, the manipulation of such
objects is difficult, even problematic.  The question then becomes one of
discovering whether or not there is a good usage of the technological
object.  Indeed, this is not a very easy question.  On this point, Vernes
text and the myth recounted in the Protagoras are in agreement.  The
armor that protects us, the carapace made of all sorts of bric-a-brac
that we put on in order to go out, is sometimes a heavy burden to carry
it can suffocate us as well.  If one thinks about it, this situation
corresponds to the logic of double bind developed by Gregory Bateson:
without technological assistance, man would die; with it, with prosthetic
devices, he can survive, but he is also condemned to live the life of a
handicapped person.  The prosthesis is like the convicts chains:  it
prevents one from walking but cannot be removed.  One must therefore
learn to live with it.
Bernard Stiegler comes to the following conclusion in his essay, and
I would concur:
Discovery, insight, invention, imagination are all, according to the
narrative, characteristic of a de-fault.  Animals are already marked by
a de-fault (in relation to being as it is and as it endures through
change, and in relation to the gods):  they perish.  One must
understand de-fault here in relation to what is, that is, a flaw in being.
And yet, whereas animals are positively endowed with qualities, it is
tekhnè that forms the lot of humans, and tekhnè is prosthetic; that is, it
is entirely artifice.  (193)
The consequence, indicates Stiegler, is rather ill fated for the human
species:
The qualities of animals make up a sort of nature, in any case a
positive gift of the gods:  a predestination.  The gift made to humanity
is not positive:  it is there to compensate.  Humanity is without
qualities, without predestination:  it must invent, realize, produce
qualities, and nothing indicates that, once produced, these qualities
will bring about humanity, that they will become its qualities; for they
may rather become those of technics.  (193-94)
Man produces qualities, but nothing assures him that once produced they will
become his.  He is thus completely given over to something that is beyond
him.  He is a hostage of his own genius.  I fear, my dear American
friend, that Jules Verne is attempting to tell us the same thing in his
novel:  anthropogenesis and technogenesis are necessarily joined.  The
more we become human, the more we become the servants of technology:
it is no use trying to disconnect the two, because this cannot be done.
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You told me that American English has a term that indicates the
overflow of technological objects in our daily lives.  This is called, as you
indicated, overload, for example, when you receive spam, which is very
bothersome, as we all know, or when your cell phone rings incessantly
and you wish it would stop, or when you want to be left alone, simply
left alone, and are not allowed this possibility.  I agree that overload is a
real threat, which we must resist.  However, I do not quite understand
how to do this.  What I mean is that I no longer quite understand after
having read Jules Verne.  As Bernard Stiegler suggests, overload is our
lot, our destiny, the price we pay for being in the modern era.  What you
call overload is perhaps, seen from this perspective, simply another name
for the human condition.
The situation is serious, but I hasten add that it is not desperate.
Perhaps we can find some consolation in the idea that we have gained
lucidity from the autonomy we have lost.  In any case, I dont hate
shepherds as much as Jules Verne did.  I have learned from his novel
and from Plato and Bernard Stiegler as wellthat we are all somehow
shepherds, in fact, and that we cannot do very much about this.  So be it.
Best regards, etc.,
FS
University of Antwerp, and Radboud University, Nijmegen
translated by David F. Bell
Notes
1. Art, that great flatterer, which always obligingly seeks consolations for people who
are too happy, has had its uninterrupted series of  pastorals.  Under the title Histoire des
bergeries I have often wanted to write an erudite and critical book in which I would
study all of these various bucolic dreams, a nourishment upon which the upper
classes have passionately feasted  (23).
2. Cf. Bucoliques, V, 44 and Victor Hugo, Notre-Dame de Paris, Book 3, Chapter 3.
3. Translators note:  Porte-vue and porte-voix cannot be translated literally into
English.  Both expressions contain the notion of carrying or projecting images or
sound over a distance.  To call Friks half-closed hand held up to his eye a tele-
scope, as the English translation is more or less forced to do, risks some confusion
with the actual telescope that quickly appears in the story, as the reader will see
shortly.
4. I refer here to The Tales of Hoffmann, the well-known operetta, as well as to The
Sandman (1815).
5. Translators note:  The author uses the French term la technique and its adjective
technique exclusively when referring to technology and technological objects in
the article.  Unfortunately, the only valid English solution is the more awkward
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technological, since technique in English does not necessarily refer to a tech-
nology, but suggests first a skill or a tactic learned and repeated.  In French, the first
meaning of technique contains the immediate notion of an object or practice that
belongs to a particular science or art.  Only at secondary level does the French
technique refer to a learned methodology in a potentially broader sense.  The
argument obviously plays on both of these meanings, but requires that the notion of
technology always be front and center, hence the necessity of choosing a form of
the term technology for translating in almost all cases.
6. A few days ago . . . a barometer dealer came into my room and offered me his wares
(1:137).  From this point of view, Vernes opera singer is also a new version of
Olimpia, a mechanical doll who never lived and who thus cannot exactly die.  Count
Télek, the man who marries her, cannot seem to understand this.  I have written about
these issues in my A distance de voix  (33ff.).
7. This is also Baudelaires question, I note in passing (Laquelle et la vraie?, Oeuvres
complètes, 1:342).
8. See Max Milners analysis:  What Jules Verne senses in Le Château des Carpathes is
that audio-visual technologies are not simply prostheses added to other instruments
at the disposal of man to transform the world:  they open gaps in the opaque and
 compact reality that surrounds us, into which our passion for the unreal and our repeti-
tion compulsion are drawn, a manifestation of the death drive (223).
9. This has been clearly pointed out by Michel Serres in his Jouvences sur Jules Verne
(241ff).  Cf. more recently Jules Verne, la science et lhomme contemporain (99).
10. Cf. this fragment of the dialogue.  The peddler:  Well, then, said the pedlar, if the
only customers I had were shepherds, Id find it hard to make a fortune.  And so you
dont want anything?  The shepherd:  Nothing at all (14).
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